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DEFAMATION IN THE WORKPLACE:
THE IMPACT OF INCREASING
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The development of workplace privacy rights' has caused a dramatic
increase in the number of defamation2 lawsuits brought against employers
by current' or former employees.4 In the past few years nearly 10,000 such
1. The development of workplace privacy rights is becoming the most dynamic area of em-
ployment law in the United States. I. Shepard & R. Duston, Workplace Privacy: Employee Test-
ing, Surveillance, Wrongful Discharge and Other Areas of Vulnerability, BNA Special Report I
(1987) [hereinafter Workplace Privacy]. This "workplace revolution" is characterized by a greater
awareness by employees of their privacy rights. This greater awareness of privacy rights has re-
sulted in employees suing their employers more frequently than in the past and receiving increas-
ingly higher jury verdicts. Id. This assertion of rights has been described metaphorically as the
use of complex and novel theories "as legal weapons to redress what they [employees] see as a
decline in their rights of privacy." Id.
The results of a survey of workplace privacy jury verdicts illustrate the increase in workplace
privacy actions filed in the 1980's and average jury verdicts against employers from 1985 to late
1987. Id. The results conclude as follows: "[J]ury verdicts against employers - based on allega-
tions of invasion of privacy - increased almost 2,000% in the last three years, compared to 1981-
84. The average jury verdict from 1985-87 in workplace privacy cases is $316,000.... In 1979-80,
there were no reported workplace privacy jury verdicts .. " Employees are Suing and Winning,
More Often, in Workplace Privacy Cases, BNA Report Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-
10 (Sept. 3, 1987).
The recognition of employees' privacy rights by the court is significant in that it has produced
"an array of complex and novel theories for aggrieved employees." Workplace Privacy, supra, at 1.
Defamation claims, however, are but one of many "legal weapons" used by employees to assert
their privacy rights. Among the more recent legal theories used by employees are claims of inva-
sion of privacy and wrongful discharge. See Workplace Privacy, supra at 2. It is within the con-
text of the emerging recognition of employee rights that this Comment will examine the
development and use of the defamation claim as one such "legal weapon" used by employees
against their current or former employers.
2. Defamation is defined in the employment context as any false statement about an employee
communicated by an employer to a third party that harms that employee's reputation or deters
others from dealing with him or her in a business setting. Defamation Is Emerging as Source of
Multiple Liability for Employers, [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 227, at A-3
(Nov. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Defamation Emerging]. For a discussion of the elements of a defama-
tion claim, see infra notes 138-207 and accompanying text.
3. Traditionally, defamation claims have arisen out of the termination of an employee. How-
ever, in recent years, liability for defamation has arisen in a variety of contexts, including em-
ployee evaluations and statements made to other employees. See Defamation Emerging, supra
note 2, at A-3; Moon, What Companies Should Know About Employee 'Defamation' Suits, 7 LAW
ALERT 119 (Dec. 28, 1987); see also infra notes 81-137 and accompanying text.
4. Workplace Privacy, supra note 1, at 99; Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits over
Defamation, The Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Stricharchuk, Fired Employees Turn the
Reason for Dismissal into a Legal Weapon, Wall Street J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 29, col. 2.
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lawsuits have been filed by employees,' and it is estimated that one-third of
all defamation cases involve employers as defendants.' This dramatic in-
crease in claims, given the existing uncertainty in the law of defamation,7
has compelled many state courts to recognize new theories to establish defa-
mation liability, particularly in the employment context., The recognition
of these new theories poses the threat of expanding liability for employers.
In response to this threat, and in an attempt to avoid liability, employers
have greatly restricted communications concerning former and current em-
ployees.9 This restriction, or "chilling effect," 10 has considerable implica-
5. See Turner, Compelled Self-Publication: How Discharge Begets Defamation, 14 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 19, 19-20 (1988) ("[A]s many as five thousand claims involving employment references
are filed each year.") (footnote omitted).
6. Stricharchuk, supra note 4, at 29, col. 1; see also Middleton, supra note 4, at 1, col. 4.
7. See Negligence, Defamation Claim Dangers are Assessed at BNA JER Conference, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213, at A-3 (Nov. 5, 1987) [hereinafter Claim Dangers Assessed] ("Many
states are recognizing new claims of defamation in the employment context, and given the flux in
the law, any generalizations about defamation claims are dangerous ...."); Middleton, supra note
4, at 31, col. 2 ("While defamation law remains in flux, lawyers remain divided over the increasing
use of such actions."). See generally SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8.08[2][c][ii] (1986)
[hereinafter SMOLLA] (discussing uncertainty of first amendment doctrine and its potential impact
on the use of common law qualified privilege). For a discussion of the uncertainty in the law of
defamation resulting from a decrease of constitutional protection, see infra notes 45-80 and ac-
companying text.
8. Claim Dangers Assessed, supra note 7, at A-3.
9. Middleton, supra note 4, at 30, col. 1 ("The threat of legal actions - and the actual ex-
pense in defending against them - also apparently has had a chilling effect on the exchange of
information that traditionally has occurred among employers."); Stricharchuk, supra note 4, at
29, col. 2 ("Anxious to avoid high costs and aggravation of libel suits, many companies are
sharply restricting information they will provide about former employees.").
The expense of defending a defamation action is a major consideration and an impetus in a
company's decision to restrict communications. It is claimed that "[d]efending such actions can
take years and cost employers tens of thousands of dollars." Stricharchuk, supra, at col. 1. One
company estimates that defending defamation suits "costs between $140,000 and $250,000 each."
Id. at col. 3.
10. The "chilling effect," or restriction in employer communications, initially came about due
to advice given employers by their legal counsel as a means to avoid the liability of a defamation
claim. Middleton, supra note 4, at 31, col. 2 ("Most lawyers are telling employers that they
should give out only the dates of employment and the positions held when asked for a refer-
ence."). Traditionally, the term "chilling effect" applied only to employee references; however, in
light of the variety of contexts from which defamation can arise, the term "chilling effect" is used
to refer to other communications as well. Id. at col. 2 ("Statistics show that employers are giving
out less information.").
It is recognized that during the past decade, the developments in anti-discrimination, privacy
and defamation have tightened constraints on employers seeking information from job applicants.
One author has stated:
[C]onstitutional law, common-law, and statutory protections of privacy rights may ex-
pressly prohibit or otherwise effectively deter employer administration of polygraph, blood,
or urine tests to ascertain veracity, determine the presence of the AIDS virus, or reveal
drug or alcohol use. Furthermore, the notorious and real threat of defamation lawsuits has
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tions upon the compelling need of employers" to maintain a safe and
efficient workplace.12
also infected, and consequently frozen, employer willingness to share information about
former employees with prospective new employers. It is now nearly impossible for an
employer to ascertain, and most unwise to disclose, substantive information about job ap-
plicants within the ranks of fellow employers.
Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligence in Hiring, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 31, 32 (1988). Ex-
amples of other communications include performance evaluations, medical reports, substance
abuse test results or any similar intra-corporate communication. See Claim Dangers Assessed,
supra note 7, at A-3.
11. The compelling need for improving the flow of information to maintain a safe workplace
is evident in light of the development of the torts of negligent hiring and negligent retention of
employees. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 10, at 32 ("The rapid proliferation of negligent hiring
litigation compels all employers to pursue prudent and adequate investigations of prospective em-
ployees before extending an offer to the applicant to commence employment."). The former is a
breach of the employer's duty to make adequate investigation of an employee's fitness before hir-
ing. Silver, Negligent Hiring Claims Take Off, 73 A.B.A. J. 72 (May, 1987). The latter is the
breach of an employer's duty to be aware of an employee's unfitness, and to take corrective action
through retraining, reassignment or discharge. Id.
The legal duty imposed upon an employer is the duty to investigate and to be aware of em-
ployee's qualifications for the job, as well as the duty to maintain those qualifications. This legal
duty owed to employees, as well as to the public, is the duty to maintain a safe environment by
taking steps to protect those whom the employer might reasonably anticipate would be injured by
the hiring. Id. at 74. Thus, it is clear, in order to be aware of potential dangerous conduct, an
employer should seek and encourage the flow of information relating to his or her employees.
The consequences of an employer's failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into the qualifica-
tions of an employee are set forth in the following passage:
[Tlhe employer can no longer afford to abandon responsible investigation into the pertinent
employment-related background of the prospective new employee. If the employer fails to
pursue an adequate inquiry before extending the offer of employment, the employer may
later find that this was the most costly error in the entire employment relationship. Cus-
tomers, clients and other employees subsequently injured by dangerous, violent, or crimi-
nally disposed employees may successfully sue the employer for the tort of negligently
hiring such employees. Courts and legislatures have been markedly unsympathetic to the
employer in negligent hiring lawsuits. If a jury finds that the employer was negligent in
seeking information about the applicant, but nevertheless hired the person, the jury can
return a verdict assessing tremendous monetary damages against the employer.
Gregory, supra note 10, at 32.
12. An employer has a legitimate concern in the protection of its business interest and in the
maintenance of a profitable and efficient workplace. In doing so, an employer has a compelling
need for effective communication. For example, it is important to hire qualified workers; thus, an
accurate reference would serve to facilitate a decision in hiring the most productive employee.
Furthermore, accurate references aid in facilitating social control:
[E]mployee misconduct is constrained by the fear of bad references. Employees may not
fear a bad reference as much as they fear dismissal, but since together these sanctions
threaten the loss of present employment and the inability to obtain a new job, the combina-
tion probably deters misconduct more effectively than either alone. The availability of such
deterrents is especially valuable in an era like the current one, when business spends bil-
lions of dollars on security.
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This Comment will discuss the impact of the expanding liability of em-
ployers resulting from defamation claims arising in the workplace. Part I
will discuss the development of the law of defamation and its applicability
in the employment context. Part II will analyze the elements of a defama-
tion claim, and Part III will address the various defenses available to the
employer. Part IV will discuss new theories of defamation that are being
recognized by the courts. Finally, Part V will address the impact of the
increasing exposure to liability for defamation claims upon the employer.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF DEFAMATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
A. Development of Defamation Law Before 1974
The development of defamation followed no particular aim or plan. 3
The common law claim of defamation evolved from the English common
law14, and prior to the evolution of first amendment constraints, was a strict
liability tort. 15 The cause of action for defamation, as stated in the original
Restatement of Torts,I6 consisted of an unprivileged publication of false and
defamatory matter, either actionable irrespective of special harm, or the
legal cause of special harm. 7 Under this common law definition, the plain-
tiff, in order to set forth a prima faie case, had to demonstrate that the
communication was defamatory 8 and that the defendant had published
Comment, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 143, 148 (1977) (footnote omitted).
13. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 772 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter PROSSER].
14. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1975). For general discussion of the
history of the law of defamation, see Carr, The English Law of Defamation: With Especial Refer-
ence to the Distinction Between Libel and Slander (pts. 1 & 2), 18 L.Q. REV. 255, 388 (1902);
Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 99; Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. REV. 302 (pts. 1 & 2), 397 (1924), 41 L.Q. REV. 13 (pt. 3)
(1925); Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1962); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1969); Veeder, The
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (pt. 1) (1903), 4 COLUM. L.
REV. 33 (pt. 2) (1904).
15. This strict liability concerning defamation is characterized by the words of Lord Mans-
field as quoted by Justice Holmes: "Whatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril." Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (citing in The King v. Woodfall, Lofft, 776, 781 [98 Eng.
Rep. 914, 916 (1774)]). For a discussion of the first amendment constraints, see infra notes 45-80
and accompanying text.
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
17. Id.
18. A statement is defined as defamatory if "it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him." Id.
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it.19 The plaintiff, however, was not required to show that the statement
was false, although the plaintiff had to plead falsity.2 ° It was the defendant
who had the burden of proving truth as an affirmative defense. 2' Damages
at common law were presumed, and no actual harm to reputation needed to
be proven in establishing a prima facie case.22 Additionally, there was no
proof of fault or "malice" requirement. 23 Therefore, once the plaintiff es-
tablished a prima facie case, the defendant could avoid liability only by
proving either substantial truth, or by proving that the statement fell within
one of a number of absolute or conditional common law privileges.24
Although bringing a claim under common law for defamation may ap-
pear simple, it is complicated by the distinction between libel and slander.25
Although defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander,26 the
original common law position was to treat libel as a more serious tort than
slander. 27 The distinction between the two terms is that libel is defamation
by written or printed words or by the embodiment of the communication in
some tangible or physical form,28 whereas slander consists of the communi-
cation of a defamatory statement by spoken words or by transitory ges-
19. Eaton, supra note 14, at 1353.
20. Id.
21. Id. Truth was a complete defense at common law, although it did not totally absolve a
defendant under some state statutory or constitutional modifications of the common law. Id. at
1353 n.16. It is interesting to note, however, that the early courts made asserting the defense of
truth dangerous for the defendant: If the defense of truth failed, the jury was allowed to find that
the defendant, in so trying to prove its truth, reiterated the defamatory statement and was allowed
to consider that fact an aggravation of damages. Id.
22. Id. at 1353.
23. The common law rule after 1825 established that malice resulting from the mere publish-
ing of the defamatory statement is conclusively implied and the defendant cannot rebut it.
Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B. 1825).
24. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 582-98 (1938).
25. Eaton, supra note 14, at 1354.
26. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 111, at 771.
27. The policies underlying this distinction arose when relatively few people could read and
the written word was thought to have a more indelible stain on the plaintiff's reputation, was
likely to reach a larger audience, and arguably evidenced greater deliberation and premeditation
by the defendant.
28. See, e.g., Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936); Ilitzky v. Good-
man, 57 Ariz. 216, -, 112 P.2d 860, 862 (1941); Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 970 (Del. 1978);
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931); Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp.,
166 A.D. 376, 152 N.Y.S. 829 (1915).
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tures.29 The distinction between libel and slander is often difficult to apply,
and because of this difficulty, a series of specialized rules has evolved.30
Although some common law distinctions remain, the distinction be-
tween the two classifications of defamation has disappeared due to techno-
logical advances. 3 Because modem forms of communication often present
as much, or more, potential harm when "oral" as when written, the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts has expanded the definition of libel to include
any "form of communication that has potentially harmful qualities charac-
teristic of written or printed words."32 Furthermore, factors to be consid-
ered in classifying the defamatory speech were specified. These factors
included the area of dissemination, the deliberateness of its publication, and
the persistence of the defamation.33
The significance of the libel/slander classification, however, concerns
the common law position "that the plaintiff in an action for slander must
prove 'special damages,' 34 unless the defamation falls within four particular
categories of 'slander per se.' "I' These categories include: (1) imputation
of a serious crime involving moral turpitude; 6 (2) possession of a loathsome
disease;37 (3) an attack on the plaintiff's competency in his business, trade,
or profession;3" or (4) an attack on chastity in a woman.39 Thus, in order to
29. See, e.g., Simpson v. Oil Transfer Corp., 75 F. Supp. 819, 822 (N.D.N.Y. 1948) (tele-
phone conversations); Aiken v. May, 73 Ga. App. 502, -, 37 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1946) (slander
defined as oral communication); Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273, _, 52 A.2d 476, 481 (1947)
(published statement); Reiman v. Pacific Dev. Soc'y, 132 Or. 82, _, 284 P. 575, 577 (1930) (slan-
der disposes with the necessity of writing).
30. For an example of the confusion in applying the specialized rules distinguishing libel and
slander, see Douglas v. Janis, 43 Cal. App. 3d 931, 940, 118 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 (1974) ("This
being a case of slander which is libelous per se .... ). For a discussion of the various rules that
evolved, see PROSSER, supra note 13, § 112.
31. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2, at 511 (1973).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (1977).
33. Id. at § 568(3).
34. The "special damages" in defamation law refers to "actual pecuniary loss." See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b (1977).
35. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 1.04[5]; see also PROSSER, supra note 13, § 112 at 788-93.
36. See Morris v. Evans, 22 Ga. App. 11, 95 S.E. 385 (1918); Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 363,
295 S.W. 138 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977).
37. This exception was originally limited to cases involving venereal diseases. See, e.g., Mc-
Donald v. Nugent, 122 Iowa 651, 98 N.W. 506 (1904); Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890
(1927). With scientific advances and the ability to cure such diseases which were in the past
thought to be permanent, this exception has been extremely limited. Today accusations of in-
sanity, tuberculosis or other communicable diseases are not included within this exception. PROS-
SER, supra note 13, § 112, at 790.
38. See, e.g., Nolan v. Standard Publishing Co., 67 Mont. 212, 216 P. 571 (1923); Dietrich v.
Hauser, 45 Misc. 2d 805, 257 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573
(1977).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
prove slander, outside of these four categories, one would be required to
prove special damages." Similarly, the rule developed that libel, in which
the defamatory meaning was clear from the face of the words, was actiona-
ble "per se" without proof of special damages, while libel, requiring proof of
extrinsic facts4' to support the defamatory meaning, did require proof of
special damages.42 The significance of these rules remains intact in most
jurisdictions because "much of the law of defamation remains the creature
of state tort law."43 However, the evolution of the first amendment restric-
tions upon the law of defamation has muted this significance to some
degree. 44
The modem "constitutionalization" 45 of the law of defamation began in
1964. During that year, the United States Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.46 This decision "constitutional-
ized" a substantial portion of the law of defamation, holding that the first
amendment47 places limitations on the defamation rules created by the
state.45 The Court stated that actions by public official plaintiffs must be
supported by a showing of "actual malice," a constitutional term of art
defined as publishing a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'49 In 1967, the United
States Supreme Court further extended the actual malice requirement to
39. See Hollman v. Brady, 233 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1956); Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243,
128 A.2d 697 (1957).
40. Slanders not falling within the four special categories of "slander per se" are referred to as
slanders "per quod." SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.04[5].
41. Libels which were not actionable "per se" were considered "per quod." "A libel not
defamatory on its face, but which becomes defamatory when its meaning is illuminated by proof
of extrinsic facts is actionable per quod." Eaton, supra note 14, at 1354-55; see, e.g., Sauerhoff v.
Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117 (D. Md. 1974) (The plaintiff's wife left him following the defend-
ant newspaper's publication of an article which reported a legal dispute between the plaintiff and
his "girlfriend.").
42. Eaton, supra note 14, at 1355.
43. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.01.
44. Id. at § 1.04[5].
45. The "constitutionalization" refers to the struggle of the United States Supreme Court to
outline the boundaries of constitutionally protected speech through the balancing of interests.
The Supreme Court has "alternatively favored first amendment press and speech rights and indi-
vidual rights to redress reputational harm. The balance currently appears to weigh more favora-
bly on the side of individual reputational interests." Comment, The "Public Interest or Concern"
Test - Have We Resurrected a Standard That Should Have Remained in the Defamation Grave-
yard?, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 647, 647-48 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
46. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.01.
49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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plaintiffs who were "public figures"5 in order to protect free speech. These
decisions provided the foundation for the evolution of first amendment con-
straints on the development of defamation law within the states.
B. Developments of Defamation Law From 1974
Most of the framework for the modern law of defamation emanates
from the United States Supreme Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,51 which established the principal dichotomy of contemporary defama-
tion law; that is, the distinction between public official and public figure
plaintiffs on the one hand, and private figure plaintiffs on the other. The
Supreme Court in Gertz reaffirmed its prior cases by holding that a showing
of actual malice was required for public figures and public officials to re-
cover.52 However, the Court held that for private figures, states could es-
tablish their own standards of liability, "so long as they did not impose
liability without fault."53 In effect, the Court required a showing of negli-
gence in all private actions. 4 Moreover, the Court in Gertz held that states
could not permit recovery of punitive damages in any case without proof of
"actual malice" and that, in all cases in which actual malice was not
demonstrated, proof of "actual injury" was required. 55
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,6 ruled that the Gertz rule restricting awards of
presumed and punitive damages to cases in which actual malice is shown
does not apply to defamatory statements which "do not involve matters of
public concern."57 "The Court thus created a major revision of Gertz, re-
turning at least a portion of the law of defamation.., back to its common
50. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The term "public figure" was used by
the Court to define a party who commanded the "public interest." Id. at 154. Additionally, the
Court noted, both "public figures" had sufficient media access to countermand defamatory state-
ments. Id.
51. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.05[3].
53. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
54. "This holding has been construed to mean that the medium must have published with
either knowledge of the falsity of the statement or recklessly or negligently with respect to the
truth or falsity of the statement in any case." PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 807. For a
discussion of the fault issues in defamation law, see id. at 802-12.
55. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. It should be noted that the term "actual harm" is a term not
limited to "special" or pecuniary loss, but includes general damage to reputation and personal
anguish, humiliation and suffering.
56. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 763.
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law status.""8 The precise scope of Greenmoss Builders remains unclear,
and it will take years for its implications to evolve fully. 9
Although the decision of the Supreme Court in Greenmoss Builders was
based upon first amendment doctrine, the Court's decision will undoubtedly
have some collateral impact on how future lower courts analyze the condi-
tional privilege protection for credit reports.6" The Court held, after exam-
ining the content, form and context of the defamatory credit report,6 1 that
such a credit report was "speech solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience."62 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded the credit report was "not [a matter] of public concern."63 The
Court reasoned "[ijn light of the reduced constitutional value of speech
involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest [in
providing effective remedies for defamation] adequately supports awards of
presumed and punitive damages - even absent a showing of 'actual mal-
ice.' "64 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no credible argu-
ment that this type of credit reporting was entitled to special protection
under the first amendment.65
58. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.05[4].
59. Id. The two principal questions the decision leaves unaddressed are the following:
[(I)] ... whether all the Gertz rules, including the no liability without fault rule, are com-
pletely outside of the First Amendment restrictions when the speech is not of "public con-
cern," or whether the case is limited to the presumed and punitive damage issues; and (2)
how courts are to define what types of speech fall within the definition of "matters of
public concern."
Id.
60. Id. at § 8.08[2][c]. In Greenmoss Builders, a construction contractor brought a defama-
tion action against a credit reporting agency which issued a false credit report to that contractor's
creditors. The report was false and grossly misrepresented the contractor's assets and liabilities.
This false credit report contained information that the contractor had filed for bankruptcy, an
error which was found to have resulted from the mistaken attribution of a bankruptcy petition
filed by a former employee of the contractor. 472 U.S. at 751-52.
61. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 761-62. The Court concluded based upon the record that
the speech at issue warranted no special protection, especially since the credit report was wholly
false and clearly damaging to the contractor's business reputation. Id. at 762. Additionally, the
Court noted that the credit report was only sent to five subscribers who could not disseminate the
information further and consequently the report did not involve any "strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information." Id. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the publication of
the report was solely motivated by the desire for profit and that, as such, the market provides the
powerful incentive to credit reporting agencies to circulate only accurate reports. Id. at 762-63.
Thus, the Court concluded that "any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits would be of de-
creased significance." Id. at 763.
62. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 762.
63. Id. at 762-63.
64. Id. at 761.
65. Id. at 762.
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C. Applicability of Defamation in the Employment Context
The decision of the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc.,66 indicates a propensity to protect an individual's
reputational interests rather than first amendment values,67 and signifies an
elevation of individual reputational interests. In particular, the decision de-
notes a general denigration of the social importance of credit reporting in-
formation, and it is likely that "credit reports will receive less favorable
common law conditional privilege protection as well."68 The significance of
this potential influence is that, given the similarity of the nature of credit
reports and reports on employees,69 it is reasonable to surmise that protec-
tion afforded to employers will likewise be diminished. Therefore, in light of
the Supreme Court's decision, lower courts may favor a weaker conditional
privilege70 that will allow a defamed person recovery on a showing of mere
negligence. Alternatively, lower courts may even eliminate the use of this
privilege because such reports are not a matter of public concern. Thus, the
potential influence of the decision in Greenmoss Builders creates uncertainty
in the area of reports on employees as it is unknown what protections will
be afforded employers.71
The uncertainty in the law created by the Greenmoss Builders decision
has been further intensified due to the fact that in the last decade there has
been a renewed fascination with defamation.72 In the past, Americans were
reluctant to pursue defamation suits;7" however, "the [legal] landscape in
66. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
67. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 8.08[2][c][ii].
69. The similarity between credit reports and reports on employees stems from the fact that
both are statements made in furtherance of the interests of others. See SMOLLA, supra note 7,
§ 8.08[2][a]. For an interesting comparison of both employer references and credit reports, see
Comment, supra note 12, at 143-53.
70. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
71. See Middleton, supra note 4, at 31, col. 2 ("With fewer or no constitutional limitations in
private defamation suits ... states will be free to re-examine their libel laws and to impose any
standards they wish - even returning to a strict liability standard of fault.").
72. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.02[3].
73. Prior to the last decade Americans have been reluctant to pursue defamation claims:
Libel litigation was perceived to be un-American. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvena-
tion of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REa. 1, 17 (1983). In 1942, David Riesman
supported the assumption that protection of reputation was relatively unimportant in the Ameri-
can capitalist culture:
[T]he American attitude towards reputation is unique. In Europe, where pre-capitalist
concepts of honor, family and privacy survive, reputation is a weighty matter not only for
the remnants of the nobility who still fight duels to protect it, but for all the middle groups
who flood the courts with petty slander litigations as we flood ours with automobile and
other negligence actions. But where tradition is capitalistic rather than feudalistic, reputa-
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recent years has changed dramatically."74 Despite the imposition of new
first amendment barriers to recovery, more suits are being brought and ju-
ries have, on the whole, proved to be sympathetic to plaintiffs both in terms
of their propensity to decide in their favor and in their propensity to award
sizable damages.7" These changes "indicate that the law of defamation is
and probably will remain an area of substantial litigation activity."'7 6
The modem defamation explosion is clearly evident in the workplace;
defamation suits against employers by former and current employees are
increasing at a significant rate.7 7 Traditionally, such suits involve employ-
ees who have been discharged or employees who have left the organization
under difficult circumstances. 78  However, in light of the "workplace
revolution,, 79 and in light of the increased interest in defamation claims,
"employers increasingly are facing liability for defamation arising in a vari-
ety of workplace contexts.",80
D. Areas Giving Rise to Defamation Claims
Employers' liability for defamation arises from a variety of contexts in-
volving employer communications. The principal employment actions giv-
ing rise to potential defamatory statements are terminations, references,
dissemination of confidential information, evaluations, and internal disci-
pline and criticism.8 It is critical to note that these claims not only arise
out of the discharge of an employee, but they also arise from "standard"
procedures necessary to maintain a safe and efficient workplace.82
tion is only an asset, "good will," not an attribute to be sought after for its intrinsic value.
And in the United States these business attitudes have colored social relations. The law of
libel is consequently unimportant.
Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 730
(1942).
74. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.02[3).
75. Id. See generally Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litiga-
tion, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455.
76. SMOLLA, supra note 7, at § 1.02[3].
77. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
78. See Martin & Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving Discharged Employees,
13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 43 (1987).
79. See supra note 1.
80. See Defamation Emerging, supra note 2, at A-3.
81. See Claim Dangers Assessed, supra note 7, at A-3.
82. Moon, supra note 3, at 119 ("[E]mployers are beginning to wake up to the fact that many
of their 'standard' employment practices could now cost them a large punitive damage award.").
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1. Employee References
A traditional area of concern for employers is providing employee refer-
ences. Over the last two centuries the number of employer references has
increased substantially; they are now written by the millions.83 Surveys in-
dicate that fifty to ninety percent of employers demand and check previous
records of job applicants. 4 Despite claims that employer references provide
little useful information, an employer typically must rely on the applicant's
previous employers and other references to aid in the assessment of the pro-
spective employee's suitability for employment." In addition, the failure to
consider employer references before hiring a new employee may lead to lia-
bility under the negligent-hiring doctrine. In assessing such claims, courts
frequently focus on the pre-employment inquiry in determining
negligence.86
Due to the widespread use of employer references, many claims arise
from former employees suing former employers for an unfavorable refer-
ence. In Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck,87 a former employee was found to be
entitled to nearly two million dollars in damages for defamation of charac-
ter. The claim arose from statements made by executives of the former em-
ployer to a private investigator posing as a prospective employer.88 Among
the statements made by the executives were claims that Buck was untrust-
worthy, disruptive, paranoid and was guilty of padding his expense ac-
count.8 9 In addition, statements were made that Buck had not "reach[ed]
his production goals." 9 These accusations were found to be false and de-
rogatory statements.9 Consequently, Buck was entitled to compensation
83. Comment, supra note 12, at 146.
84. Id.; see also Stevens, The Letter of Recommendation as a Privileged Communication, 16
AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 1 (1978). But see Middleton, supra note 4, at 30, col. 2 ("A recent survey by a
Chicago-based outplacement consulting firm found that prospective employers did not check the
references of nearly seventy-five percent of their job candidates... because the former employers
are not expected to cooperate ...."). For discussions of the use of employer references, see M.
MANDELL, THE SELECTION PROCESS: CHOOSING THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB 256 (1964)
(75% of companies studied check references of prospective employees); Nash & Carroll, A Hard
Look at the Reference Check, 13 Bus. HORIZONS 43 (1970).
85. Stevens, supra note 84, at 1.
86. See Claim Dangers Assessed, supra note 7, at A-3.
87. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985).
88. Id. at 617. The statements were made to an investigator who posed as a prospective
employer; the investigator was hired to discover Hall's true reasons for terminating Buck's em-
ployment. Despite the fact Buck hired the investigator, the court did not find that he had con-
sented to these statements. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 618.
91. Id. at 616.
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for the derogatory statements made about him reflecting on his integrity
and his ability to produce business.92
In light of the "chilling effect" on employer communications in recent
years, new concerns regarding employer references have emerged. As many
former employers are commonly advised to provide prospective employers
with only an employee's name and the dates of his or her service, new
claims have been filed alleging that such references are defamatory because
such references appear tantamount to giving a bad reference. Although
such claims have not proved to be successful,9 3 in light of the increasing
liability of employers, the courts may adopt such a view.
In Buffolino v. Long Island Savings Bank,94 a former employee claimed
that a letter of reference sent by a former employer to a prospective em-
ployer was defamatory.9" The reference merely provided dates of the plain-
tiff's employment and stated that it was company policy to provide no other
information to potential employers.96 In addition, the letter specifically
stated that the "failure to comment on an individual's character does not
reflect on the individual."97 The court found that this letter was not of a
defamatory nature.98 However, it must be noted that a reference which
merely provides the "'name, rank and serial number' [of an employee may
lead to liability] particularly in view of an employer's potential liability for
failure to disclose critical information that it is certain is accurate." 99
2. Internal Communications
Internal communications are a growing area of concern for employers.
Within this context, defamation liability can arise from a number of em-
92. Id. at 630.
93. Austin v. Torrington Co., 810 F.2d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 1987) (former employer's statement
that he was not able to recommend plaintiff for employment was not defamatory), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 489 (1987); McKinney v. Armco Steel Corp., 270 F. Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1967)
(former employer's designation of reason for discharge was false, but employee not entitled to
recover because reasons were not communicated to a prospective employer). But see Herberholt
v. DePaul Comm. Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 1981) (Missouri allows recovery
when plaintiff loses a potential job by absence or adequacy of a service letter under state service
letter statute.).
94. 126 A.D.2d 508, 510 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
95. Id. at __, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Defamation Emerging, supra note 2, at A-4. The potential liability for an employer's
failure to disclose critical information refers to the "negligent reference theory" that is expected to
emerge. See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text. This negligent reference theory would
hold a former employer liable for failing to disclose to a prospective employer the known unfit-
ness, incompetence or dangerousness of a former employee.
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ployer actions: in-house communications, dissemination of information to
clients or customers, and statements made at a discharge meeting. In
Frankson v. Design Space International,"° a former employee brought an
action against his former employer for the preparation of a termination let-
ter that was distributed "in-house." The employer, however, was found not
liable as there was no evidence of malice.' 0 ' The court concluded that
"neither the language used, 'failure to increase sales,' nor the mode and
extent of publication, communication to those involved in the decision mak-
ing process and deposit of a copy in Frankson's personnel file, allowed the
conclusion that the statement was malicious."' 2 In addition to formal "in-
house" communications, statements made among corporate executives have
given rise to defamation claims. In Robison v. Lescrenier,03 a corporate
president made a statement to the corporation's personnel and management
consultant. The remark claimed the vice president of sales, Robison, was
fired from his last job and "has an ability to run all his companies out of
money."" ° The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that this
statement was made with reckless disregard of the former employee's
rights. 0 15 Thus, the employer was liable for a $10,000 award of punitive
damages. 10 6
Moreover, an employer can be liable for communications made to its
clients regarding a discharge of a former employee. In Griffith v. Electrolux
Corp.,' ° 7 a former employee maintained a claim for libel and slander based
upon false statements published by the employer. The employee alleged
that the employer published false statements that claimed the former em-
ployee had been discharged because he was "a thief, was selling stolen prop-
erty and had cheated customers."'' 0 Additionally, an employer may also
become liable for communicating the reasons for a former employee's dis-
charge to other employees. These defamation claims typically arise out of
meetings in which employers express reasons for discharging a former em-
ployee. In Gonzalez v. Avon Products, Inc.,' 0 9 eight employees who were
discharged for theft claimed that their former employer defamed them by
communicating to co-employees the reasons for their discharge. The court
100. 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986).
101. Id. at 144.
102. Id.
103. 721 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 1111.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1111-13.
107. 454 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1978).
108. Id. at 32.
109. 648 F. Supp. 1404 (Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1987).
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noted that the speech was delivered "in order to quell employee fears about
the... plant's future... [and] the speech only concerned the plaintiffs as
far as the plaintiffs' termination related to the job security of the remaining
.. employees."11  While it is established that co-employees have a legiti-
mate interest in the reasons why a fellow employee was discharged, 111 it
is critical to note that the employer cannot excessively publish this
information.
1 2
3. Substance Abuse Testing
Substance abuse testing is emerging as a new area of concern for em-
ployers. Due to the costs and dangers associated with drug and alcohol
abuse in the work force, employers need to test employees for such abuse. , 3
An employer who tests employees for drug and alcohol use may face tort
actions for defamation by employees who resist testing or who face disci-
pline for positive test results.1 14 Because of the particularly intrusive nature
of drug testing and an employer's interest in assuring a safe and productive
workplace, an employer must implement drug testing programs which yield
110. Id. at 1408.
111. See, e.g., Knight v. Baker, 173 Ind. App. 314, 317, 363 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (1977) (all
employees have common interest in operation and atmosphere of work place); Hall v. Rice, 117
Neb. 813, 814, 223 N.W. 4, 5 (1929) (communication to all clerks in store informing them another
clerk was charged for embezzlement was privileged); Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172
S.E.2d 720, 723 (1970) (employee had interest in discharge of co-employee and handling of com-
pany funds).
112. See, e.g., Zinda v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., No. 86-0737 (Wis. Sup. Ct. May 31, 1989)
(Excessive publication found to be proper factual question for injury where an employer publi-
cized defamatory reasons for discharge in company newspaper that its employees routinely re-
moved from the premises without employer indicating that the information was to be kept
confidential.). The excessive publication of allegedly defamatory information beyond persons who
are not reasonably believed necessary to obtain such information may result in a loss of a condi-
tional privilege. This conditional privilege allows employers to publish defamatory material if the
publication of that material furthers a legitimate business interest. For a discussion of the scope
and abuses of the conditional privileges, see infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text. Thus,
excessive publication may result in liability if the employer can provide no other defense for pub-
lishing defamatory material.
113. See NYU Conference Speakers Discuss Tension Between Privacy Rights and Drug Testing,
[Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 112, at A-13 (June 12, 1987) [hereinafter
Privacy Rights and Drug Testing] ("[C]osts of drug abuse for employers, while difficult to quantify,
are substantial because workers with drug problems are more likely to cause industrial accidents,
are absent more often than other workers, and have higher medical costs than other employees
.... [It is] estimated that employers lose $25 billion dollars a year because of drug abuse."). See
generally Comment, At Work While "Under the Influence" The Employer's Response to a Haz-
ardous Condition, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 88 (1986).
114. Conference Panelists Say Testing Programs Should Be Crafted to Protect Employee Pri-
vacy, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 205, at A-9 to -10 (Oct. 23, 1986) [hereinafter Testing
Programs].
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reliability and provide for a "chain of custody" in handling test results." 5
Consequently, the failure to provide confidentiality for test results could
potentially result in a defamation claim.'16
In Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. Wherry," 7 the employer, after
the employee submitted to an initial drug test, filed an accident report indi-
cating that methadone was in the employee's system. This report was sent
to seven company officials.'8 The report contained the following: "Labora-
tory results of the urine specimen was [sic] positive for methadone, which is
a synthetic drug commonly used in the withdrawal treatment of heroin ad-
dicts.""' 9 The court held that such statements were libelous, because they
implied that the former employee was using methadone and was a heroin
addict. 120
4. AIDS Testing
A more recent concern involves AIDS testing.' 2 ' Testing employees for
AIDS presents a greater potential for invasion of privacy than substance
abuse testing because the employer's interest is diminished. This is so be-
cause the AIDS virus does not normally impair job performance, and AIDS
is not spread through workplace contacts. 2 In AIDS testing programs, as
in substance abuse testing, confidentiality must be ensured. Employers fail-
ing to provide confidentiality are most vulnerable to a defamation claim. In
1986, for example, an Ohio man who was named in an anonymous note as
having AIDS, sued his former employer for defamation of character after
the contents of the note were disclosed. 23
5. Inaccurate Personnel Files
Although test results are kept confidential, the employer may still be
liable for a defamation claim if these results are made part of an employee's
personnel file. A personnel file contains the information that an employer
uses to make employment-related decisions including hiring, promotions,
115. Privacy Rights and Drug Testing, supra note 113, at A-12.
116. See Drug Testing Here to Stay, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at A-13 (June 5, 1987).
117. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
118. Id. at 746.
119. Id. at 747.
120. Id. at 748.
121. "AIDS" stands for acquired immune deficiency syndrome. This disease is caused by a
virus most recently referred to as HIV, or human immunodeficiency virus. See U.S. DEP'T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REP. ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROME, (1987).
122. Testing Programs, supra note 114, at A-10.
123. AIDS, Individual Employee Rts. Manual (BNA) 509:206 (Jan. 1, 1987).
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transfers, discipline and termination. 12 4 A defamation claim may be made
by an employee who, upon examining his personnel file, finds the notation
"drug user" when he merely tested positive for drugs. 125 Such a notation
"comes too close to calling the employee a drug addict... [and] ... [i]t
would be safer to enter in the file only that the employee had tested positive
for a controlled substance, with no comment as to whether the employee is
a drug user." 126
In recent years, the maintenance of an accurate personnel file has be-
come particularly important because of the increasing information that em-
ployers have concerning their employees. Also, with the great advantages
of sophisticated, electronic technology, employers are able to gather, con-
trol and communicate vast amounts of information about their employ-
ees. 127 Under common law, an employee did not have a right of access to
his or her personnel files. However, as more states require that employees be
given the right of access to their personnel files, the potential for an em-
ployer's liability likewise increases. As a result of this change in common
law, it is anticipated that employees will in fact examine their files and thus
detect potential defamation claims. Consequently, employers may be sub-
ject to a defamation claim if such information is disclosed. 128
6. Performance Evaluations and Conduct Investigations
A growing area of concern to employers regarding defamation claims is
the evaluation of employees. Such evaluations frequently involve investiga-
tions of employees suspected of theft or dishonesty, as well as routine per-
formance evaluations. It must be noted that such evaluations are essential
to maintaining a safe and efficient workplace, and, if neglected, may give
rise to tort liability under the theory of negligent hiring of an employee. 129
The investigation and awareness of employees' conduct are essential to
the maintenance of a safe and efficient work place. In Tellez v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co., 3' a station manager observed what he thought was an em-
124. BNA Conference Speaker Stresses Need for Accurate Personnel Files, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 216, at A-1 (Nov. 10, 1987).
125. Id.
126. Id. at A-I to -2.
127. See Castagnera-Cain, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Actions in Typical Employee
Relations Situations, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1982).
128. Workplace Privacy, supra note 1, at 83; cf Emergence of State Employment Rights Is-
sues, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 212, 212 (Feb. 15, 1988) ("Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Texas have made it unlawful to disclose any
information contained in employee personnel files.").
129. See generally Gregory, supra note 10.
130. 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 251 (1987).
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ployee buying cocaine on the job. 131 The security department was informed
of the observation and, after the employee denied the allegation, the station
manager sent a letter to eleven other managers containing a conclusion that
the employee had bought cocaine on the job.' 3 2 The court held that the
employee had maintained a cause of action for defamation based upon these
facts. 3 3 In a similar case, Chapman v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 34 an employee
was accused of theft. After the employer was notified that the employee was
stealing money from a snack bar, the employer began to investigate the
theft charges. While the investigation gave rise to a defamation claim, the
employer was not liable for defamatory statements made to police officers
because the employee consented to the presence of the officers.' 35
Routine performance evaluations have also formed the basis of defama-
tion claims. In Turner v. International Business Machines Corp.,' 36 an em-
ployee sued his employer charging that his performance evaluation was
defamatory. This report contained the deficiencies of the employee's per-
formance. The court held that the communication of this report to other
supervisors, managers, secretaries and attorneys was invited by the em-
ployee. The court noted: "So long as an unfavorable report by a supervisor
is communicated only to those persons who have a duty to review employ-
ees, or to make and investigate personnel decisions, there is no publication
[of defamatory material]."137
II. ANALYSIS OF A CLAIM: EXAMINING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
A. The Defamation Claim
Defamation' 38 is the unprivileged publication of a false 13 9 statement in-
tending"4° to harm' 4 ' the reputation of another person.' 42 In the popular
131. Id. at 536-37.
132. Id. at 537.
133. Id. at 539.
134. 2 I.E.R. Cases (BNA) 1255 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1987).
135. Id. at 1259.
136. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4887 (S.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1982).
137. Id. at 4889.
138. At common law defamation was classified into libel and slander. Libel consisted of de-
famatory matter published by printed or written words. Slander consisted of defamatory matter
published by spoken words or transitory gestures. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568
(1977); see also supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 31.
139. A statement cannot be defamatory if it is true. See, e.g., Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp.
Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (statements alleged were not defamatory because they
were true).
140. The defamatory character of the statement depends upon its general tendency to cause
harm to another's reputation or deter third parties from associating with him/her. It should be
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sense, defamation is that which tends to injure one's reputation.143 How-
ever, the tort of defamation has specific applicability within the employ-
ment context. 144 Defamation within this context arises from the
communication of a false statement which imputes that a person lacks the
ability to perform employment duties in a respective business, trade or pro-
fession. 45 A claim within this context is actionable without the proof of
actual damage, provided that the defamatory statement is incompatible
with the proper conduct of that business, trade or profession. 146
B. Examining the Elements
To create liability for defamation, the following elements must be
proven: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2)
an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication.147 Essentially, the elements for a claim include a
false and defamatory statement that is communicated by speech, conduct or
in writing to a third person. 48 It must be noted that a complaint setting
emphasized that actual harm does not have to result for a statement to be considered defamatory.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment d (1977).
141. The nature of the harm should be clarified. Because a communication is defamatory
does not mean harm will automatically result. Such a communication may not cause harm be-
cause the other's reputation is so hopelessly bad or so unassailable that no words can affect that
reputation harmfully or because of lack of credibility of the defamer. Id.
142. Personal Rights: Defamation, Individual Employee Rts. Manual (BNA) 515:100 (Jan. 1,
1987).
143. Defamatory statements which are said to injure reputation are those that tend to dimin-
ish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse,
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against the plaintiff. See PROSSER, supra note 13,
§ 111, at 773.
144. Id.
145. See Erickson v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3621, 3623 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill. App. 3d 536, 542, 447 N.E.2d 446, 449 (1983); Makis v.
Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 456, 395 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (1979); see also Cas-
tagnera-Cain, supra note 127, at 6.
146. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 112, at 791. The statements must refer to the nature of the
ability of the plaintiff to perform employment duties as opposed to a more general reflection upon
the plaintiff's character or qualities. Compare Kraushaar v. LaVin, 181 Misc. 508, 42 N.Y.S.2d
857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (statement that an attorney is "unethical") with Weidberg v. La
Guardia, 170 Misc. 374, 10 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (statement that attorney is "a bum
in a gin mill" was not actionable since it did not attack the ability of the attorney to perform his
duties satisfactorily).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
148. See, e.g., Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 517, 362 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Ct. App.
1984), appeal denied, 122 Wis. 2d 782, 367 N.W.2d 222 (1985).
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forth these elements must do so with specificity,' 49 the complaint must spe-
cifically state the defamatory words,' 50 the connection of these words to the
plaintiff, and the scope of publication"5 ' of these words. 152
1. A False Statement
The requirement that a claim for defamation is based upon a false state-
ment involves two inquiries. The first is whether the statement is true and
the second is whether the communication is a statement of fact, not merely
an expression of opinion. In most jurisdictions it is presumed that all defa-
mation is false, and the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving
149. See, eg., Johnson v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652 (S.D.
1986) (mere conclusory statements that plaintiffs have been damaged in their reputations and
hindered from obtaining and holding permanent employment is not sufficient to support a claim
for defamation); cf. Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (complaint that sets out detailed statements of facts as
the facts followed by numerous claims of injury resulting from, inter alia, various torts referring
only to "aforementioned conduct" will not support a claim for relief, facts and cause of action
must be specifically stated to give rise to a claim for which relief may be granted).
150. See McCarthy v. Cycare Sys., Inc., 2 I.E.R. Cases (BNA) 680 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (claim for
defamation failed on account of a failure to allege the utterance of any defamatory statements or
the publication of such statements).
151. See Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (allegation that
the employer defamed the employee by stating that he was "fired for stealing" falls short of stating
a claim where there is no indication of where, when or to whom the statement was made); see also
Crocker v. Chamber of Commerce, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4067 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (employee fails to
state publication of defamatory statements to a third party); Lekich v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (claim for defamation failed because plaintiff
made no allegation that allegedly defamatory remarks were published); Williams v. Delta Haven,
Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (employee fails to state that any defamatory remarks
were published).
152. Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984) (citing
Pursell v. Wolverine-Petronix, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 416, 421, 205 N.W.2d 504 (1973) (quoting I1
CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN PLEADING & PRACTICE § 78.09, at 256-57 (2d ed.))). In this case, the
plaintiff's complaint alleged the following:
That on various occasions subsequent to the wrongful termination of plaintiff's employ-
ment, defendant, by and through it agents and employees, communicated to various per-
sons including, but not limited, to the Michigan Employment Security Commission and
prospective employers that the reason for plaintiff's discharge was due to inventory control
shortages.
Ledl, 133 Mich App. at 587, 349 N.W.2d at 532. The court dismissed the complaint for summary
judgment because defendant did not specifically set forth (1) the defamatory words, (2) the con-
nection of the defamatory words with plaintiff, and (3) the publication of the alleged defamatory
words. Id.
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its truth.'53 Therefore, truth is an absolute defense to a defamation
action. '54
At common law an expression of opinion could be defamatory, although
certain opinions on matters of public concern could qualify as forms of priv-
ileged criticism protected by the first amendment.155 According to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, there are two types of opinion - a pure type
and a mixed type. ' 56 The pure type occurs when the maker of the comment
either states the facts upon which that opinion is based or, if unexpressed,
both parties to the communication know the facts or assume their existence
prior to the making of such a statement. This pure type of opinion may not
be the basis of a defamation action because it offends the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech. 157 In contrast, the mixed type of opinion is
based upon facts regarding the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been
stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the parties prior to the com-
munication. In the mixed type of opinion, the expression of the opinion
gives rise to an inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the
forming of the opinion expressed by the speaker.158 Thus, because this in-
ference is drawn from undisclosed facts, this mixed type of expression of
opinion may be the basis for a defamation.
The determination of whether a statement is a pure or mixed type of
opinion is considered similar to the determination of whether a statement is
a fact or opinion. I" Thus, courts have applied a four-factor analysis to
determine whether statements are constitutionally protected expressions of
opinion or actionable statements of fact. ' 6 0 This four-factor analysis exam-
ines the statement in light of the totality of the circumstances in which that
statement is made. 6 ' The four factors which courts consider are: (1) the
common usage of the statement; (2) whether that statement can be verified;
153. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 116, at 841. Since "truth" is customarily a defense to a defa-
mation claim, this Comment will include its discussion of the element of truth as a defense in Part
III. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 1987) (citing
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980)); Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888-89 (Minn. 1986); Williams v. Journal Co., 211 Wis. 362,
370, 247 N.W. 435, 439 (1933).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977).
156. Id. at comment b.
157. See Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
960 (1979).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, at 172 (1977).
159. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 985 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
160. Id. at 979.
161. Id.
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(3) the context of the statement; and (4) the broader context of events sur-
rounding the making of the statement. 162
In the employment context, since an employer must assess an em-
ployee's performance and, if necessary, discipline or terminate the employee
on the basis of that assessment, the distinction between a statement of fact
and an expression of opinion is critical. The need for employers to conduct
frank and honest appraisals was evident in MacFarlane v. Turner Broad-
casting Systems, Inc. 13 In MacFarlane, the employee, who was denied a
promotion, claimed that a letter sent to her indicating that her performance
had been disappointing was defamatory.' The court examined the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the letter contained statements
of fact or opinion. In its analysis, the court suggested that, since the em-
ployer has the ability through access to work records, statements such as
performance evaluations are based on undisclosed facts. 65 This case im-
plies that it will be difficult for employers to prove employee evaluations are
opinions.
Similarly, in Falls v. Sporting News Publishing Co.,' 66 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit found that the statement of a president of a
sports magazine claiming that a columnist who had been discharged was
"on the downswing," could be regarded as defamatory. 67 The court drew
this conclusion since such statements might imply that the president knew
undisclosed facts that would justify such an opinion. Such undisclosed
facts, the court reasoned, could include that the writing and reasoning abil-
ity of the columnist had deteriorated or that the quality of his work had
declined to the point that others had to rewrite or cover for him. 8
In contrast, the court in Schnelting v. Coors Distributing Co.,169 found
that a statement made by a general manager in explaining the reason for an
employee's discharge was an opinion.' 70 The statement was made that the
employee "was fired for stealing, [the employee] actually was giving a case
of beer away; and that's stealing company property.' 71 As an opinion, the
court stated the statement was absolutely privileged under the first amend-
162. Id. at 979-85; see also MacFarlane v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 120 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3203, 3206 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
163. MacFarlane, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3203.
164. Id. at 3204.
165. Id. at 3206.
166. 834 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1987).
167. Id. at 616.
168. Id.
169. 729 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
170. Id. at 217.
171. Id. at 215.
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ment of the Constitution. 172 The court held that the statement was an opin-
ion because the employer, in communicating the reasons for the employee's
discharge, allowed the listeners to draw their own conclusions about
whether those acts amounted to stealing. 173 Also, the court noted that the
statement was made in the arena of labor relations and, because the em-
ployer was apparently having problems with its inventory, such an expres-
sion stressing the importance of complying with company policy would be
privileged. 174 Thus, it appears that an employer's statements in order to be
protected under the first amendment must expressly state reasons for such
an evaluation of an employee's conduct.
2. Publication
Publication is an essential element of a defamation claim 175 and is de-
fined as the communication of the defamatory statement to any third
party. 176 To establish publication, it must be shown that the statement was
understood in its defamatory sense, 17 7 and that such publication was not
made with consent.1 71 In general, a defamatory writing is not published if it
172. Id. at 217.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. United States Steel Corp. v. Darby, 516 F.2d 961, 963 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Burney v.
Southern Ry., 276 Ala. 637, 165 So. 2d 726 (1964)); Lekich v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Weir v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 221 Ala.
494, 496, 129 So. 267, 270 (1930); see also supra note 14. See generally PROSSER, supra note 13,
§ 113.
It is important to note that the term "publication" does not mean the statement must be
printed or written; it may be oral, or conveyed by means of gestures, or the exhibition of a picture,
statute or sign. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 797.
176. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 798.
177. Id. E.g., Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C. 1984) (the fact that people
outside the faculty knew the contents of allegedly defamatory report does not establish plaintiff
was defamed).
178. See, e.g., Chapman v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 2 I.E.R. Cases (BNA) 1255, 1259 (Ga. Super.
Ct. 1987) (employee accused of theft who requested police to be present during interrogation by
employer held not to have been defamed by employer's publication of accusation to policewhere
she invited such publication to police); Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 561,
298 N.W.2d 915 (1980) (discharged corporate officer may not maintain claim for slander against
superior for remarks made at a meeting called by plaintiff in order to discuss superior's dissatisfac-
tion with her performance).
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is read by no one but the defamed person; 179 however, it is published as
soon as it is read by someone else. 180
This general rule has been the subject of controversy when applied by
the courts to intra-corporate communications.18 ' This controversy is
largely due to a tendency to confuse the question of publication with that of
privilege.182 A majority of the courts hold that circulations of libel within a
corporation can amount to actionable publication, despite the fact that
communications were between employees or officers of the same corpora-
tion. 183 However, some courts hold that publication cannot occur between
officers, agents and employees of a corporation.'84 The majority position,
consonant with the positions taken by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 85
and Professor Prosser,'86 relies upon the distinction between publication
and privilege. 87 Publication is any communication to a third party, while a
privilege provides protection for the legitimate interest of promoting free
communications involving business-related matters. The rationale for the
minority view is that these officers are engaging in the same business trans-
action; therefore, these officers are participating in the publication, and as
such, should not be considered third parties. 188
179. See, e.g., Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, -, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1171 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (statements made privately to plaintiff not
actionable); Crocker v. Chamber of Commerce, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4067 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (em-
ployee fails to state claim for slander where employer did not communicate reasons for employee's
discharge to anyone other than employee).
180. Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (quoting Os-
trowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 505 (1931)), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979).
181. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 798-99.
182. Id.
183. E.g., Pirre, 468 F. Supp. at 1041; see also Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 236 Kan. 710,
711, 695 P.2d 1279, 1279 (1985) (inter-office communication among supervisory personnel was
publication); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 542, 23 N.W.2d 247, 257 (1946)
(dictation to stenographer was publication).
184. See, e.g., Turner v. International Business Machs. Corp., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4887,
4889 (S.D. Ind. 1981); see also Ellis v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 581 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (no publication found when communication made only to supervisory personnel
within corporation); Prins v. Holland-N. Am. Mortage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 208, 181 P. 680, 680-
81 (1919) (corporation communicating within itself does not publish a libel). See generally Com-
ment, Intra-Corporate Communications: Sufficient Publication for Defamation or Mere Corporate
Blabbing?, 7 COMM./ENT. L.J. 647 (1985).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment i (1977).
186. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 113, at 799 n.17.
187. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
188. A strong argument against this position is presented in Pirre, 468 F. Supp. at 1041, and
is as follows:
While corporate officers may be... the embodiment of the corporation, they remain indi-
viduals with distinct personalities and opinions, which opinions may be affected just as
surely as those of other employees by the spread of injurious falsehoods. It is this evil that
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While defamation usually requires written or verbal publication to a
third party,189 courts have become more receptive to creative approaches
made by plaintiffs to fulfill the requirement of publication. The satisfaction
of the publication requirement in the employment context has, in recent
years, extended to cover silence, conduct and even inaction. The result of
this extension has been the expansion of the definition of publication and
the creation of a disturbing trend for employers.
3. Defamatory Meaning
The most fundamental element of a defamation claim is a defamatory
communication. A communication is defamatory "if it tends so to harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the commu-
nity or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."1 90
Moreover, an allegedly defamatory statement must be more than unpleas-
ant or offensive; the language used must make the plaintiff appear odious,
infamous or ridiculous. 91 The burden of proving the defamatory nature of
the statement rests on the plaintiff.1 92 Since "[t]he meaning of a communi-
cation is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably,
understands that it was intended to express," '93 the plaintiff must prove
what the recipient understood was the meaning intended to be expressed. 194
Unless there is no reasonable doubt, the jury must determine the meaning
and the construction of the alleged defamatory language. 195
the law of defamation is designed to remedy. To find no inter-personal communication
when a corporate employee speaks to a corporate officer would be to ignore the distinct
personalities of the human beings involved.
189. Middleton, supra note 4, at 30, col. 3.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
191. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Johnson v. Johnson
Publishing Co., 271 A.2d 696, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
192. Howard Univ., 484 A.2d at 992; Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572
(Minn. 1987).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 (1977).
194. Id. at comment e.
195. Id.; see Falls v. Sporting News Publishing Co., 834 F.2d 611, 615-16 (6th Cir. 1987) ("It
is the function of the court to determine whether an expression of opinion is capable of bearing a
defamatory meaning because it may reasonably be understood to imply the assertion of undis-
closed facts that justify the expressed opinion about the plaintiff or his conduct, and the function
of the jury to determine whether that meaning was attributed to it by the recipient of the commu-
nication."); Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463, 2470 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("When
there is any doubt regarding whether a communication can carry a defamatory meaning, the
Court must dissolve that doubt in favor of sustaining the sufficiency of the complaint."). But see
Ericksen v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3621, 3624 (N.D. I11. 1984)
("The question of whether a statement may reasonably be innocently construed is initially a mat-
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The test for determining whether a communication is defamatory is
whether the communication is obviously defamatory in the eyes of the com-
munity.1 96 In making this determination, courts consider the obvious and
natural meaning of the statement, 197 the context198 and the extrinsic cir-
cumstances 99 under which this statement was made. This is necessary be-
cause the context of the statement may be used to infer a defamatory
meaning into an apparently non-defamatory statement.2 °" However, it
must be recognized that this flexibility allows the courts to expand the po-
tential for liability.
Illustrative of the flexibility afforded the courts is Klages v. Sperry
Corp. 201 In this case, a discharged corporate attorney stated a claim for
defamation alleging that a press release published by the corporation car-
ried with it the implication that the attorney had resigned under the veil of
suspicion or scandal.2 0 2 The press release was published at the time the
attorney was terminated stating that the attorney had "suddenly re-
signed."2"3 The court added that the statement contained the following im-
plication to prospective employers: "[I]n hearing an attorney 'suddenly
resigned,' the prospective client or employee might infer that the attorney
did not properly attend to former clients' affairs before resigning." 2" An-
other example of this flexibility is Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.205
The defamation claim arose when a former employer told a state agency
ter of law; only if it is not capable of being so construed may the question be given to the finder of
fact for a determination of whether it actually was so understood.") (emphasis added).
In Ericksen, the court noted that Illinois actions for libel and slander are controlled by the
innocent construction rule: That is, statements must be innocently construed where reasonable.
In effect, such a rule creates a rebuttable presumption that the statement alleged is not defama-
tory. While the applicability of such a rule is limited, it tends to operate in raising the level of
proof required by the plaintiff. Under such a construction the plaintiff must show that it would be
unreasonable to construe the statement as nondefamatory instead of raising a doubt as to whether
the statement has a defamatory meaning. Id.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e (1977).
197. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 573 (citing Church of Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical
Ass'n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1978)).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 comment d (1977).
199. Id. at comment e.
200. Falls, 834 F.2d at 615; see also Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 554
(E.D. Mich. 1979); cf. Schnelting v. Coors Distrib. Co., 729 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 789 (Mo. 1985) ("The importance of the totality
of the circumstances test is that it looks to all relevant circumstances to determine whether a given
statement is actionable.")).
201. 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
202. Id. at 2470.
203. Id. at 2465.
204. Id. at 2470.
205. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
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that the employee had been terminated because he had been rude to cus-
tomers and "had refused to provide full service to a handicapped cus-
tomer. '2 6  The plaintiff argued that this statement implied that he
discriminated against the customer because the customer was handi-
capped.07 These cases illustrate the wide latitude used by courts when de-
termining whether the implication of a statement is defamatory.
IV. DECREASING AVAILABILITY OF EMPLOYERS' DEFENSES
A. Truth
For employers, the availability of truth as an absolute defense to a defa-
mation action has become limited.2°8 Although truth was never a favored
209defense, in recent years it has become much more difficult for an em-
ployer to assert. The prominent view toward the assertion of truth is that
the truth must go to the underlying implication of the statement, not to its
verbal accuracy.210 Hence, if an employee is told that he is being fired for
gross insubordination, the defendant must prove that the employee was
in fact insubordinate, not merely that he was fired for gross
insubordination. 1
A new concern for employers has been brought to the surface in the case
of Zinda v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.z1 a In this case, an employer terminated
an employee who allegedly "falsified employment forms. 21 3 The Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals held that the employment forms were of an ambiguous
nature and that such ambiguity is to be construed against the drafter.21 4
Thus, since the form was not specific as to the time (present or future) to
which the questions were referring, there was no basis upon which the em-
ployer could conclude that the employee had in fact "falsified employment
forms. 2 15 Therefore, the employer failed to show the substantial truth of
the statement that the employee did in fact falsify employment forms. The
significance of this decision is that standard employer practices, such as
206. Id. at 570.
207. Id. at 573.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment e (1977).
209. See PROSSER, supra note 13, § 116.
210. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986).
211. Id. In Lewis the court, in response to employer's assertion of truth as a defense, found
that the company's charges went beyond accusations and were conclusory statements that plain-
tiffs had engaged in gross insubordination. Id.
212. 140 Wis. 2d 277, 409 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, No. 86-
0737 (Wis. Sup. Ct. May 31, 1989).
213. Id. at 278, 409 N.W.2d at 438.
214. Id. at 279, 409 N.W.2d at 440.
215. Id.
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employment inquiry forms, can give rise to defamation liability. More im-
portantly, however, this case indicates that, even if employers have docu-
mentation as to their reasons for terminating an employee, such
documentation may not prove useful in withstanding a lawsuit.
B. The Conditional Privilege
1. Scope of the Privilege
To encourage the free flow of communications between employers and
employees, the law has recognized a qualified privilege "to publish defama-
tory material if the publication is reasonably necessary to the protection or
furtherance of a legitimate business interest." '216 The standard that controls
the operation and scope of the privilege is as follows:
A communication made in good faith and on a subject-matter in
which the person making it has an interest, or in reference to which
he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person or persons having a
corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous, provided the
statement is made without malice and in good faith.2 17
The conditional privilege arises when a communication is made between
two parties with a common interest.218 Within the employment context, the
employer's interests in protecting its property investment and in maintain-
ing employee morale have allowed the employer to engage in communica-
tions with employees who have an interest in continuing that
employment. 219 For example, an employer is protected in criticizing his
employees' performance in periodic evaluations so long as it is made to fur-
ther serve the parties' legitimate interests.
The inquiry a court utilizes in determining whether a communication is
qualifiedly privileged consists of a two-step process. 220 First, the court de-
termines whether an occasion for the privilege arises. If such a determina-
tion is found, the jury must evaluate whether that privilege was abused.221
216. Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 95, 508 N.E.2d 72, 79 (1987) (citing Bratt v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 512-13, 467 N.E.2d 126, 131 (1984)).
217. Garziano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, -, 157 So. 705, 708 (1934)).
218. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 8.08[2][a].
219. See Garziano, 818 F.2d at 387.
220. Id. at 386.
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (1977) (The court determines whether
the occasion gives rise to a privilege. The jury determines whether the privilege is overcome or
abused.).
It is critical to the analysis to distinguish between the occasion of the privilege and the abuse of
the privilege. An occasion of privilege arises when the evidence establishes certain circumstances
1989]
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There are numerous circumstances which give rise to the privilege. How-
ever, although the application of this privilege is quite broad, the scope of
its applicability depends upon the jury's determination of whether it was
abused.
2. Abuse of the Privilege
An employer can abuse its privilege in a number of ways. The five occa-
sions giving rise to abuse of the conditional privilege, as stated in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts2 2 2 are as follows:
(1) The defendant knew the matter to be false or acted in reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity.
(2) The defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than
that for which the privilege is given.
(3) The publication is to some person not reasonably believed to be
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privilege.
(4) The publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably be-
lieved to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the privi-
lege is given.
(5) The publication includes unprivileged matter as well as privi-
leged matter.
The standard used to determine whether the conditional privilege is
abused is different in each jurisdiction. Traditionally, the courts have re-
quired that malice, or ill will, be shown in order to prove an abuse of the
privilege. Because this is a jury question, most juries find malice in situa-
tions where an employer cannot prove the truth of the statement.223 Due to
the decreasing strength of the truth defense, it will be difficult for employers
to bring forth such evidence. 224 The loss of this conditional privilege will be
devastating to many employers as it will hinder their ability to discipline
employees.
Illustrative of the potential danger of the loss of the conditional privilege
is the case of Garziano v. E.1 Du Pont De Nemours Co.225 In this case,
Garziano, an employee, was fired for allegedly sexually harassing a co-em-
ployee. After his termination, co-employees expressed fears and concerns
which support a duty recognized by law to make an honest statement of fact: Thus, a determina-
tion of whether an occasion for a privilege arises is arrived at through an examination of the
circumstances under which the statement was made. Essentially, the question becomes whether
the recipient had a "need to know" the information.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600, 603-05A (1977).
223. Workplace Privacy, supra note 1, at 101 ("Juries tend to infer malice when an employer
cannot prove that the statement is true.").
224. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
225. 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
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about job security to management. To address these concerns, the em-
ployer issued a restrictive bulletin to their 140 supervisors.226 This bulletin
described the incident with the intention of informing its employees what
conduct constitutes sexual harassment and to explain the company's policy
toward such action.227 Although the court found that the publication of the
bulletin was issued on an occasion of privilege, the issue was submitted to
the jury for a determination as to whether the privilege was abused by ex-
cessive publication. The court's concern regarding the excessive publication
issue was that the information may have been communicated to independ-
ent contractors working on the premises who may not have been parties of
interest and, therefore, are not "privileged" to receive the information.228
C. Preemption
Employers subject to a collective bargaining agreement may be able to
assert the defense that the state law tort claim of defamation is preempted
by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Management Relations Act.229
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act rests jurisdiction in
the federal courts to hear claims for violation of labor contracts.230 In 1966,
the United States Supreme Court in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,23'
held that courts could hear defamation claims only upon safisfaction of the
following two limitations: (1) that the plaintiff would be required to prove
an intentional or reckless misstatement; and (2) the plaintiff would have to
226. Id. at 276. The court notes that the employer, DuPont Company, utilizes a number of
different means to communicate with its employees. The company on this occasion issued a Man-
agement Information Bulletin. This bulletin is distributed in envelopes only to the supervisors
and is the most restrictive form of communication in place at the DuPont plant. Id. at 276 n.6.
227. The introductory paragraph to the bulletin stated:
The recent sexual harassment incident which resulted in an employee's termination has
raised supervisory and employee questions about the subject. This particular incident was
determined to be a serious act of employee misconduct, but in deference to the employees
involved cannot be discussed in detail. However, deliberate, repeated and unsolicited phys-
ical contact as well as significant verbal abuse was involved in this case.
Id. at 276.
228. See id. at 285; cf. Rouly v. Enserch Corp., 835 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1988) (Employ-
ers are liable only for an employee's actions within the course and scope of employment: Sales-
man's gossip was verbal equivalent to a "frolic and detour.").
229. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1985); see, e.g., Willis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254 (4th
Cir. 1988) (Section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act preempted state law claim of defa-
mation because employer's alleged wrong was in exercise of rights pursuant to labor contract.).
230. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act states: "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce... may be brought in any distict court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties .... " 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
231. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
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prove that it caused him or her damage.232 In 1985, however, the Court
held that parties cannot escape the preemptive effect of Section 301 by cast-
ing their claims as tort claims rather than contract claims.233
To determine the scope of the preemption, the question which must be
addressed is whether the claims can be resolved only by referring to the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.234 The test specifically for
tort claims is "whether an evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably inter-
twined with the consideration of the terms of the labor contract., 235 Of
increasing importance is the presence of the actual malice standard and also
the state's interest in protecting the reputations of its citizens: "[T]he pre-
emption doctrine should not be used as a shield to protect malicious false-
hoods where the state has an overriding interest in protecting its citizens
from the damage which those falsehoods inevitably cause., 236 Thus, this
"state interest" caveat provides courts with considerable flexibility in deter-
mining whether a claim is preempted.
Illustrative of this flexibility is Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 237
In Krasinski, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed an appellate court deci-
sion which overturned a lower court's finding that a defamation claim was
preempted.238 In this case, the employee claimed he was defamed by a no-
tice sent to his union and co-workers stating that he was discharged for
theft of company property. 239 The employer claimed that its actions were
within the scope of the labor contract and were consistent with the manage-
ment-union process for handling disputes over employee misconduct pursu-
ant to the labor contract.24 While this contention was granted by the trial
court, the contention was reversed at the appellate level.24 By invoking the
state interest caveat, the appellate court asserted that an "action will stand
regardless of whether resolution of the action will ultimately be determina-
tive of issues to be decided by an arbitrator."242 The court's decision
stressed that "where the complaint alleges actual malice ... the action is
232. D. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 521.
233. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985).
234. Id. at 213.
235. Id.
236. Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., 135 I1. App. 3d 831,_, 508 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (1987)
(citing Fisher v. Illinois Office Supply Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1001, 474 N.E.2d 1263, 1267
(1985)).
237. 124 1l.2d 483, 530 N.E.2d 468 (1988).
238. 135 II. App. 3d 831, 508 N.E.2d 1105 (1987).
239. Id.
240. Id. at -, 508 N.E.2d at 1110.
241. Id. at , 508 N.E.2d at 1111.
242. Id. at -, 508 N.E.2d at 1110.
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not preempted by section 301 of the [Labor Management Relations
Act]." '24 3 The court in Krasinski relied heavily upon the allegation of mal-
ice in rendering its decision. 2' Thus, the actual malice standard is critical
in asserting the defense of preemption, since this standard is closely akin to
the determination of whether the statement alleged to be defamatory is true.
Therefore, it is critical for an employer to examine its ability to prove the
truth before establishing a defense.
D. Absolute Privilege
The defense of absolute privilege, if established, serves as a complete
defense.24 Thus, there is no liability established, even if the defamatory
statement is maliciously stated. Within the employment context, certain
situations are said to give rise to the assertion of an absolute defense.246
The most common situations are those statements that are consented to,
those statements that are part of a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding,
or those statements that arise in grievance procedures.
Consent provides the basis for an absolute privilege.247 For example, an
employee that requests the employer discuss dissatisfaction with work per-
formance has consented to such statements of criticism and is therefore pro-
hibited from claiming slander as a result of that discussion.248 In addition,
statements made as part of a quasi-judicial administrative hearing are abso-
lutely privileged. Therefore, a claim for defamation cannot be maintained
against a former employer who listed reasons for an employee's suspension
and subsequent discharge as "willful misconduct" and "dereliction" on
forms submitted by the employee to the state Employment Security Divi-
sion in an application for unemployment compensation. 249 The rationale
for adopting and including administrative agencies as a "judicial proceed-
ing" according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts250 rests on sound pub-
243. Id. at -, 508 N.E.2d at I I 11.
244. Id. ("We believe ... Illinois state law also gives each and every one of its citizens the
right to not be maliciously defamed by others regardless of whether that person is an employee
subject to a collective bargaining agreement. A cause of action for malicious defamation exists
independently of the collective-bargaining agreement.") (emphasis added).
245. See, e.g., Watts v. Grand Union Co., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3158, 3160 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
246. See PROSSER, supra note 13, § 114.
247. See, e.g., Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 561, -, 298 N.W.2d 915,
922 (1980).
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1980).
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 comment a (1977); see also PROSSER, supra
note 13, § 114, at 818-20.
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lie policy. Due to complexities in modem society, the role of administrative
law both in its rule-making and adjudicative aspects has expanded. "With
that expansion has come a concomitant recognition by many courts that
certain attributes of the judicial process have equal relevance to those ad-
ministrative bodies that utilize a quasi-judicial process in the determination
of individual rights, privileges or obligations.
2 1
Of perhaps greater applicability, statements arising in grievance proce-
dures are absolutely privileged. Simply stated, the rationale for the applica-
bility of an absolute privilege in a grievance procedure is that "damage suits
predicated on statements made in the grievance procedures would tend to
interfere with frank and strong statements of positions in such proceed-
ings." ' The core of this rationale is the promotion of industrial peace in
allowing an employer and employee to settle issues of concern through a
process of conferences and collective bargaining. To assert the privilege
under this circumstance, the statements must satisfy two requirements: (1)
the statement must be made during a conference or session having for its
purpose the adjustment of a grievance procedure or other peaceful disposi-
tion of such a grievance; and (2) the defense of an absolute privilege should
be applied to a statement made at such a proceeding, that is, the privilege is
necessary to promote an activity encouraged by federal law. 53
While the absolute privilege is not subject to defeasance as are condi-
tional privileges, it must be noted that circumstances in which absolute
privileges may be asserted are extremely limited. 4 Such absolute privilege
accommodates situations only toward the identity of the speaker or to the
forum in which the speech takes place. Thus, the applicability of the abso-
lute privileges is much more limited than those of conditional privilege,
where the establishment of its use depends upon the relationship between
the speaker, the audience and the subject of speech. 5
251. Magnan, 37 Conn. Supp. at -, 429 A.2d at 495-96; cf. Citizens State Bank v. Libertelli,
2 I.E.R. Cases (BNA) 116 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (Bank's distribution of unfiled complaint not
protected because its publication was not a part of judicial process.).
252. Brooks v. Solomon Co., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3003, 3006 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
253. Id. at 3305-06.
254. See SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 8.07[2].
255. Id.
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V. EMERGING THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS TO EMPLOYERS
A. Compelled Self-Publication
The doctrine of compelled self-publication holds that a defendant is re-
sponsible for a plaintiff's publication where: (1) the defendant could foresee
that the communication would take place; and (2) the plaintiff was under a
strong compulsion to publish the statement.256 This theory is said to have
given rise to the "no comment" trend of employers and is the exception to
the general rule that in order to satisfy the publication requirement of a
defamation claim, the communication must be made to a third party.257
The implication of this theory is that it allows discharged employees to, in
effect, sue for the tort of wrongful discharge, whether recognized by the
appropriate state or not.
258
In recent years, a substantial line of cases applying the doctrine of com-
pelled self-publication within the employment context has emerged. The
most noteworthy case is Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.259 In
this case, four employees were discharged for the stated reason of "gross
insubordination. ' 260 The facts giving rise to this discharge stem from the
employees' refusal to revise expense reports to reflect a lower figure in order
to comport with company policy.26 1 The basis of the established liability
was the fact that the employer told these employees they were being fired
for engaging in "gross insubordination," which was defamatory. This de-
famatory statement was then communicated to prospective employers of
the employees; however, the communications were made by the employees
themselves.262 The issue thus raised is whether the employer can ever be
liable for defamation where the statement in question was published to a
third party only by the employee. The court answered this question in the
affirmative.263
The court rejected the company's contentions that recognition of the
doctrine of self-publication (1) amounts to creating tort liability for wrong-
256. See Prentice & Winslett, Employee References: Will a "No Comment" Policy Protect
Employers Against Liability for Defamation?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 207, 210 (1987).
257. See Blodgett, New Twist to Defamation Suits, 73 A.B.A. J. 17 (May 1987); Middleton,
supra note 4, at 30, col. 1.
258. See Comment, Employment Defamation Expands Employer Liability in the At-Will Con-
text, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 585 (1987).
259. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
260. Id. at 880.
261. Id. at 881.
262. Id. at 886.
263. Id. at 888.
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ful discharge; and (2) would discourage employees similarly situated from
mitigating damages.26 In addressing the first contention, the court claimed
that rejecting tort liability for wrongful discharge did not preclude a tort
claim for harm resulting from a bad faith termination of a contract.265 In
resolving this issue, the court defined the cause of action for defamation as
an independent tort.26 6 The second contention was dismissed by the court
by concluding that in this case the employees could not have mitigated their
damages.267
In recognizing compelled self-publication, the court stated:
We acknowledge that recognition of this doctrine provides a signifi-
cant new basis for maintaining a cause of action for defamation and,
as such, it should be cautiously applied. However, when properly
applied, it need not substantially broaden the scope of liability for
defamation. The concept of compelled self-publication does no
more than hold the originator of the defamatory statement liable for
damages caused by the statement where the originator knows, or
should know, of circumstances whereby the defamed person has no
reasonable means of avoiding publication of this statement or avoid-
ing the resulting damages; in other words, in cases where the de-
famed person was compelled to publish this statement. In such
circumstances, the damages are fairly viewed as the direct result of
the originator's actions.268
While it is claimed that the adoption of such a theory does not discour-
age employers from giving feedback and references or create undue increase
in employer liability, this has not been the case. 269 Due to the fear of poten-
tial litigation, the acceptance of new theories of liability and the increased
jury sympathy in conjunction with the diminished effect of the employer
defenses, employers have reduced such communications. Although it may
be suggested that a reduction in communications will reduce discipline and
deterrents to misconduct and, because of this factor employers would not
reduce communications, it is essential to recognize that the practical em-
ployer does fear the threat of a lawsuit. Two advocates of the adoption of
this compelled self-publication theory claim that undue increase in em-
ployer's liability is unlikely "if attorneys do their job and explain to clients
264. Id. at 887-88.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 888 ("Their only choice would be to tell them 'gross misconduct' or to lie.
Fabrication, however, is an unacceptable alternative.").
268. Id.
269. See Comment, supra note 258, at 628-29.
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the realities of defamation litigation."27 This assessment fails to take into
account, however, employers' practical considerations as well as their natu-
ral reactions. These factors cannot be ignored as such an assessment should
focus on an employer's perspective, not on the role of third parties.
B. Negative Inferences
A disturbing trend in defamation law is that of liability based upon in-
ferences resulting from a negative implication given from silence or inaction
on behalf of the employer.271 In Tyler v. Macks Stores, Inc.,272 a former
employee brought a lawsuit against his former employer claiming that his
discharge, following the giving of a polygraph test and the immediate firing
of the manager thereafter, gave fellow employees and others the feeling and
belief that he had been discharged for some wrongful activity.273 The em-
ployee contended that this "insinuation and inference of wrongdoing can
amount to the publication of defamatory matter."274 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina adopted this contention.275 Another court adopted the con-
tention that a defamatory meaning was conveyed by the method which an
employer packed and removed documents from a discharged employee's
office after a termination and responded to co-workers' inquiries into the
process and basis for those actions by saying that "they didn't want to
270. Prentice & Winslett, supra note 256, at 235 (emphasis added).
271. This trend is most disturbing to the employer because liability is based upon the em-
ployer's silence or inaction. This basis of liability creates uncertainty as to whether the employer
has an affirmative duty to prevent, for example, co-employees from drawing inferences of an em-
ployee's wrongdoing. This would be a most difficult or perhaps impossible task, especially consid-
ering the employer's need to maintain a safe and efficient workplace.
272. 275 S.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 633 (1980).
273. Id. at 457, 272 S.E.2d at 634.
274. Id. Compare Gay v. William Hill Manor, Inc., 74 Md. App. 51, 536 A.2d 690 (1988)
(mere act of employer escorting an employee from the building after termination of employment,
without more, does not constitute a defamatory publication), cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d
964 (1988) with Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970) (accusations
and conduct of employer under circumstances such that a reasonable person would interpret re-
marks to be defamatory satisfied publication requirement).
275. Tyler, 275 S.C. at -, 272 S.E.2d at 634. The court concluded that such "[a] novel issue
such as here presented is best decided in light of the testimony to be adduced at trial." Id. (citing
Williams v. Streb, 270 S.C. 650, 243 S.E.2d 926 (1978)).
The court also suggested that "management's silence after discharging an employee" may be
the basis for a finding of defamation. Personal Rights: Defamation, Individual Employee Rts.
Manual (BNA) 515:101 (Jan. 1, 1987). The court in Tyler noted: "A mere insinuation is as
actionable as a positive assertion if it is false and malicious and the meaning is plain." 275 S.C. at
457, 272 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting Timmons v. News & Press, Inc., 232 S.C. 639, 644, 103 S.E.2d
277, 280 (1958)).
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know. 2 7 6 Moreover, another court accepted the contention that an em-
ployer who "intentionally and unreasonably failed to remove" a small sign
thereby published its contents.277 The cumulative effect of these cases
clearly indicates that courts are expanding the elements of defamation and
allowing new interpretations to be entertained by juries resulting in ex-
panding liability for employers. In light of the fact that juries are more
sympathetic to defamation claims and are awarding higher verdicts,278 this
impact is devastating for employers.
The impact of such increasing exposure to liability suggests that an em-
ployer has an affirmative duty to prevent co-employees from deriving such
inferences. Additionally, this liability also serves to promote the fear of
employers that disciplining or discharging an employee may give rise to
liability for defamation. However, the devastating impact of these decisions
is the courts' failure to recognize employers are without any mechanisms to
prevent inferences being drawn from their conduct. For example, the em-
ployer may be liable for defamation if it published a bulletin explaining an
incident if persons receiving it would be outside the "need to know"
group.279 This would result in the loss of protection of the qualified busi-
ness privilege for such a communication. In light of this trend and the
increasing trend of juries to find abuses of the qualified business privilege, it
appears employers are uncertain whether to disseminate such information
concerning the discharge or discipline of an employee. Both these trends
indicate that the employer is placed in a precarious position.
C. Negligent References
Due to the "chilling effect" of employer communications, most former
employers are providing the prospective employer with merely the name
276. Coleman v. American Broadcasting Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3324, 3332 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
277. Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987). The court in this case
further concluded:
Tacket has an unenviable task, because even if he persuades the jury that General Motors
published the small sign by inaction, that he took appropriate steps to deal with the sign,
and that the sign defamed him, he still must trace injury to that sign. The consequences of
the incident itself and the ensuing suspension, the rumors within the plant and community,
the meetings to pass the word about his suspension, and the large sign are not G.M.'s
responsibility. It will be hard, perhaps impossible, to attribute damages to the small sign
alone. But if Tacket wants to attempt this feat, he is entitled to try.
Id. at 1047. This statement clearly represents both the attitudes of plaintiffs in bringing creative
claims alleging new theories of defamation and the courts' increasing willingness to accept new
creative theories as a basis of defamation liability.
278. See supra note 1.
279. See, e.g., Garziano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987).
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and dates of service of the former employee.18 0 As a result of these prac-
tices, it is predicted the negligent reference theory will continue to de-
velop.28 The negligent reference theory attaches liability to the writer of a
reference under the rules governing the tort of negligence. This liability
provides the main basis for compensating losses inadvertently caused
outside a contractual relationship. The negligent reference theory is said to
have developed in response to the "no comment" practices of most employ-
ers when requested to provide a reference because such practices are con-
trary to public policy. This practice does not serve to benefit either the
employee seeking employment or the employer seeking to screen applicants.
In addition, it has been claimed that the negligent reference theory can also
give rise to a third party claim "against the former employer for any mis-
representation that occurred when a prospective employer makes a refer-
ence inquiry." '282
While there are no cases supporting this assertion, it is logical that the
former employer has a duty of care to the prospective employer. While the
development of this theory would appear to encourage employers to pro-
vide references to prospective employers, it also may contribute to an undue
increase in litigation. To avoid this theory of liability, attorneys are
strongly urging employers to seek releases from their former employees as
well as from their prospective employees before seeking or giving refer-
ences.283 This practice would seem the better approach; however, problems
may still arise.
VI. THE IMPACT OF EXPANDING LIABILITY
A. The Chilling Effect
The threat of defamation liability undoubtedly has had a crippling effect
on employers. The principal employment actions giving rise to statements
that can be defamatory are terminations, references, evaluations, the dis-
semination of confidential information beyond the "need to know" group,
and internal discipline or criticism. Since employers are more hesitant to
discipline, terminate and supply useful information to other employers, the
cumulative effect of this hesitation is contrary to public policy. As public
policy in the past has called for the protection of legitimate business inter-
ests, courts today are not enforcing these policies. "[C]ourts are faced with
a powerful conflict between protecting the substantial social interest in can-
280. Claim Dangers Assessed, supra note 7, at A-4.
281. Id. at A-5.
282. Id.
283. Id. at A-4.
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did and honest appraisals of an employee's competence and the equally sub-
stantial interest in safeguarding the individual employee from undeserved
injury. ' 284 In response to this conflict, courts increasingly have been choos-
ing to protect individual interests over the protection of business interests.
The results of the court's favoring the individual reputational interest
are devastating. Employers no longer enjoy the scope of protection as tradi-
tionally afforded; accordingly, they are less likely to discipline, evaluate and
provide information. As a result, employers, as a group, will be stripped of
the very mechanisms that aid them in providing a safe and productive
workplace.
B. Negligent Hiring/Negligent Retention: Creation
of the Obvious Dilemma
The increase of negligent hiring and negligent retention claims is an evi-
dent result of the increasing danger of the "chilling effect." Negligent hir-
ing is a breach of the employer's duty to make an adequate investigation of
an employee's fitness before hiring him." 5 The chilling effect on communi-
cations seriously impedes an employer's inquiry into an applicant's job per-
formance for a former employer. Moreover, the increase in negligent
retention is also affected. Negligent retention is the breach of an employer's
duty to be aware of an employee's unfitness and to take corrective action
through retraining, reassignment or discharge.2" 6 Because employers are
more reticent in approaching employees for fear of liability, the potential
for claims rises. Due to the "chilling effect," the retraction of the protec-
tion traditionally afforded to employer communications deprives employers
of the devices that in the past protected employers from negligent retention
and negligent hiring claims. Ultimately, employers are left in a precarious
position as they are subject to defamation liability; failure to provide such
employer communication contributes to potential liability for negligent hir-
ing and negligent retention.
C. Resolution of the Obvious Dilemma
In light of the growing need for employers to communicate useful infor-
mation to other employers and their employees, the need to address em-
ployer concerns has risen sharply. The obvious dilemma created that must
284. SMOLLA, supra note 7, § 8.0812][d].
285. See Note, Negligent Hiring: Employer's Liability for Acts of an Employee, 7 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 603 (1984); Note, Recognition of Negligent Hiring Expands Employer Liability, 10
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361 (1984).
286. See Silver, supra note 11, at 73.
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be addressed by courts and legislatures is the uncertainty of the applicabil-
ity of defamation law within the employment context.
Although courts have been less inclined to protect employer communi-
cations in recent years, the resulting dangers presented call for a greater
recognition of the protection of useful communications. Thus, courts will
be forced to provide certainty on the issue of how much protection will be
afforded employers after the Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.287 decision. Due to the safety concerns involved, courts must distin-
guish the differences between credit reporting and reports evaluating em-
ployees. Such distinctions will compel the courts to conclude that
employers need to be afforded greater protection. Moreover, legislatures
may have to take the lead to provide certainty for employer communica-
tions. For example, some legislatures have responded to increasing liability
stemming from inaccurate references and have adopted "service letter" stat-
utes. 88 These statutes require all employers to provide, at the former em-
ployee's request, a letter that describes the nature and duration of services
rendered by the employee and a true statement of the reason for the em-
ployee's discharge or resignation. In some states, an employer that willfully
or negligently fails to furnish the required information is subject to both a
fine and imprisonment. 89 Such laws will most likely be enacted in response
to increasing employer liability.
CONCLUSION
Within the employment context, defamation liability has posed serious
concerns to employers. The pervasive nature of this liability has impeded
the furtherance of an employer's legitimate interest in providing a safe and
efficient workplace which benefits both employers and employees as well as
the public. In order to maintain a safe and efficient workplace, however, an
employer must be afforded a means to do so. Employer communications
provide the essential means by which safety and efficiency in the workplace
can be advanced and, as such, employers must be protected from liability
arising from such communications.
ANN M. BARRY
287. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
288. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.470 (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-211
(1984).
289. Workplace Privacy, supra note 1, at 84.
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